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Field detection and monitoring of explosives
Jehuda Yinon*
National Center for Forensic Science, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-2367, USA
Detection of explosives in situ is of major importance
in several applications: finding hidden explosives in
airport luggage and in mail; screening of personnel
for concealed explosives; environmental monitoring
of explosives-contaminated sites; and, detection of
buried landmines. Mobile and hand-held detectors
have been developed for the various applications.
They can be sub-divided into three classes: vapor
and particle detectors; radiation detectors; and,
biochemical detectors. An overview of the various
explosives detectors and their principles of operation
is presented. # 2002 Published by Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Field detection of explosives is an extremely
relevant analytical issue in law enforcement and
environmental applications.
With the increasing use of explosives by ter-
rorist groups and individuals, law enforcement
and security agents are faced with the problem
of detecting hidden explosives in luggage, mail,
vehicles, aircraft, on travelers, and so on.
In bombing-scene investigations, it is impor-
tant to find debris that includes explosive resi-
dues. Mobile and hand-held explosives
detectors, similar to those used for detecting
hidden explosives, can be of great help in
detecting such residues.
On-site environmental detection and mon-
itoring of traces of explosives and their degra-
dation products is necessary in areas suspected
of being contaminated by toxic explosives in
order to monitor the quality of groundwater and
prevent poisoning of populations of humans
and animals.
The detection of landmines is an acute, urgent
worldwide problem that needs specific and
effective field-detection methods.
The common issue in the various applications
is that one has to deal with the detection and
identification of very small amounts of explo-
sives. However, specific instruments and tech-
niques have been developed for most
applications.
2. Detection of hidden explosives in
airline luggage and mail [1,2]
A list of the most widely encountered high
explosives is shown in Table 1. It includes the
vapor pressures of the various explosives in
pure form [2]. Plasticized explosives have a
lower vapor pressure.
2.1. Vapor and trace detectors
These detectors measure traces of character-
istic volatile compounds that evaporate from
the explosive or are present as particles on the
explosive’s container surface.
Vapor samples are collected from the target
area or object by drawing ambient air into the
detector. Particle samples are collected by wip-
ing a surface with a paper filter trap or with
hand-held vacuum, followed by desorption into
an analyzer/detector.
In addition, chemical preconcentrators have
been developed in order to increase detection
sensitivity. Most preconcentrators are based on
drawing in a large volume of air, collecting
organic compounds – that include the explo-
sives – from the air stream onto a chemical
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filter, followed by vaporizing these organics into
the detector.
Instruments used in the field include: gas
chromatograph (GC) with electron capture
detector (ECD) [3]; GC with chemilumines-
cence detector, also known as thermal energy
analyzer (TEA); ion mobility spectrometer
(IMS); and, mass spectrometer (MS).
The TEA is a nitrogen-specific detector [4–6],
in which the nitroexplosive analyte, eluting from
the fast GC, is introduced into a pyrolyzer.
Compounds containing nitro groups decom-
pose to produce a nitrosyl radical, NO , by cat-
alytic reduction of the liberated NO2. The NO
passes into a reaction chamber, where it is oxi-
dized by ozone, forming electronically excited
nitrogen dioxide, NO2*, which decays back to
its ground state with emission of chemilumi-
nescent light in the near-infrared region. The
emitted light is detected by a photomultiplier.
The light intensity is proportional to the NO
concentration and hence to the nitrocompound
concentration.
A red filter is placed in front of the photo-
multiplier to block any light with a spectral fre-
quency higher than the near-infrared. Analysis
takes about 18 s. Although there is no manu-
facturer data on sensitivities and false-alarm
rates of the TEA explosives detector [7],
laboratory tests showed that the sensitivity of
the GC-TEA for explosives was in the low
picogram range.
The IMS [8] comprises a sample-inlet system,
an atmospheric pressure ion source followed by
an ion-molecule reactor, ion-drift spectrometer
and a detector. Analyte ions are formed in the
reactor and injected, by an electric field, into the
drift region, where they are separated according
to their mobility. The ion-mobility spectrum
consists of a plot of ion current as a function of
drift time. The drift time depends on the ionic
mass: heavier ions move at a slower speed and
therefore have a longer drift time.
Ions are formed in an atmospheric pressure
ion source, by electrons emitted from a 63Ni
beta source or by electrical discharge. IMS has
become a widely used technique for the detec-
tion of traces of hidden explosives [9]. For the
detection of explosives, air or nitrogen at atmo-
spheric pressure is used as both carrier and drift
gases. Introduction of a reagent gas will increase
sensitivity and selectivity. For example, hexa-
chloroethane (C2Cl6), will produce a reagent ion,
Cl, which will undergo ion-molecule reactions
with an explosive molecule to form adduct ions
of the type (M + Cl). Formation of reagent
ions, such as NO2
 and NO3 has been
observed in nitramine and nitrate ester explo-
sives, respectively, resulting in adduct ions of
the type (M + NO2)
 and (M + NO3) [9,10].
The IMS explosives detector can detect and
identify RDX, PETN, TNT, Semtex, tetryl,
nitrates, NG and HMX. Detection limits are in
the picogram range for NG, TNT, RDX and
Table 1
List of widely used high explosives [2]
Trade name or
abbreviation
Chemical name Major ingredients Vapor pressure at ambient
temperature [torr]
TNT 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene 5.8106
Tetryl 2,4,6,N-Tetranitro-N-methylaniline 5.7109
RDX 1,3,5-Trinitro-1,3,5-triazacyclohexane 4.4109
HMX 1,3,5,7-Tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazacyclooctane 3109 (at 100C)
PETN Pentaerythritol tetranitrate 1.4108
NG Glycerol trinitrate (Nitroglycerin) 3.1104
EGDN Ethylene glycol dinitrate 0.07
Composition C-4 RDX + plasticizer
Composition B RDX + TNT + wax
Semtex-H RDX + PETN + plasticizer
Detasheet PETN + plasticizer
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PETN and in the nanogram range for tetryl and
HMX. Time of analysis is 6–8 s [10].
A battery-operated, hand-held version of the
IMS explosives detector weighs 2.6 kg and has
an analysis time of 10–15 s. Warm up time is
less than 5 min [11]. A GC-IMS configuration
for identification of explosives in post-blast
samples showed detection limits in the pico-
gram range for all tested explosives [12].
In MS, identification of analytes is by ioni-
zation and mass analysis of the ionized atoms
and molecules of which the analyte is composed
[1,2]. The principle of mass analysis is that
parameters of time and space of the path of a
charged particle in a force field in vacuum
depend on its mass-to-charge ratio (m/e).
Ionization methods that have been used in
MS explosive detectors are: atmospheric pres-
sure ionization (API) with corona discharge
[13,14]; atmospheric glow discharge ionization
(ASGDI) [15]; and, atmospheric sampling pho-
toionization [16]. Although the mass analyzer
has to be under vacuum, mobile mass spectro-
meters for on-site analysis and monitoring have
been constructed. The mass analyzer is usually
ion trap, quadrupole or time-of-flight. Detection
limits were found to be in the sub-picogram
range [14,15].
Tandem mass spectrometry (MS/MS) [1,2]
(Fig. 1) has been used in MS explosives detec-
tors in order to increase selectivity [4]. In MS/
MS, after mass analysis of the ionized sample, a
preselected precursor ion will collide with an
inert gas, such as helium or nitrogen, resulting
in collision-induced dissociation (CID). The
fragment ions thus produced are mass analyzed
and recorded. The MS/MS-CID mass spectrum
provides a ‘‘fingerprint’’ of the precursor ion
and provides an additional dimension of selec-
tivity in the identification of the analyzed sample.
A real-time sampling and MS detection sys-
tem was developed [17]. In this system particles
are removed from the surface to be examined,
transported along a flexible tube, and deposited
on a moving belt. The explosives are then ther-
mally desorbed and the vapor is transferred into
the ionization region for subsequent ionization
and mass analysis by MS/MS.
2.2. Bulk detection
Bulk-detection methods use penetrating
radiation that interacts with certain nuclei char-
acteristic to explosives. Although many of these
instruments are quite large, they have been placed
in airports to detect hidden explosives in luggage.
2.2.1. X-rays
X-rays useful for detection of explosives have
energies from a few thousand up to several
million electron volts. Various X-ray detection
systems [2] have been used, based on dual-
energy analysis, low-angle X-ray scattering or
computed tomography (CT). A commercial
Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of an MS/MS system.
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detection system for airport baggage, based on
CT technology, was found to have a throughput
rate of up to 800 bags per hour [18]. No quan-
titative data on sensitivity and false alarm rate
have been published.
2.2.2. Neutron analysis
Thermal neutron analysis (TNA), fast neutron
analysis (FNA) and pulsed fast/thermal neutron
analysis (PFTNA) are based on the excitation of
elements in the explosives by neutrons. TNA
[19] uses the capture of low-energy neutrons in
the nitrogen of the explosive and measures the
resulting characteristic capture gamma ray. Fig. 2
shows the nitrogen density of common materi-
als and explosives. FNA [20] uses pulses of
higher energy neutrons that create characteristic
gamma rays from nitrogen and other con-
stituents, such as oxygen, carbon or chlorine,
found in the high-explosive charge. PFTNA
[21] uses pulses of high-energy neutrons to
initiate several types of nuclear reactions in the
scrutinized object. The gamma rays from these
reactions on elements such as C and O are
detected and stored. Some of the fast neutrons,
after thermalization, are captured by elements,
such as H and N, to produce gamma rays. The
scrutinized object is characterized by the gamma
rays originating from the fast and thermal neu-
tron reactions.
2.2.3. Nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR)
NQR is tuned to respond to the interaction of
radio-frequency (RF) energy with nitrogen in
Fig. 2. Nitrogen density of common materials and explosives. Reproduced from Reports OTA-ISC-481 (1991) and OTA-ISC-511
(1992), US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC, USA.
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the crystalline structure of explosives, such as
RDX, which is a major explosive in many plastic
formulations [22,23]. According to the manu-
facturer of a commercial NQR detection system,
it has a false alarm rate of less than 3% [18].
2.3. Explosives-detection portals [2,24]
The portal is intended to identify passengers
who have recently handled explosives. The
portals look like an airport metal detector with
vents and nozzles on its inside walls and ceiling.
The passenger stands inside the portal for a few
seconds or passes through, while a gentle flow
of air is passed over him. The air sample is then
collected, concentrated and passed through a
detector that recognizes any explosive present.
The detector can be ECD, TEA, IMS or MS.
Current portals with trace detection based on
IMS, ECD and TEA have sensitivities in the
parts per trillion (ppt) range [24]. The analysis
time of such a portal with IMS detection is
about seven people per minute [25]. An MS/
MS-based personnel-screening portal was
developed using a combination of ion trap and
time-of-flight mass analyzers [26]. Explosive
vapor-detection limits were in the ppt range and
residue-detection limits in the low-picogram
range. Detector response time was 2 s.
2.4. Scanning documents
People routinely handle their identification
cards, boarding passes or other documents, thus
transferring any explosives residue from their
fingertips onto their documents.
A document scanner can collect any trace
particles that might have been deposited
through routine handling and identify them.
The detectors that have been used for scanning
documents are IMS and MS. An automated
system was built with an MS/MS triple-quadru-
pole mass spectrometer detector [27]. The des-
orption of explosives from the passes was
carried out with short-wave infrared radiation.
The vapors produced were drawn into the MS/
MS mass spectrometer and monitored. Detec-
tion limits, from the surface of boarding passes,
were less than 100 pg for TNT, RDX, PETN
and NG. The system was able to handle a
throughput rate of 1000 boarding passes per
hour. The desorption (from the boarding cards)
efficiency of the system was found to be
between 70% and 100%, depending on the
thickness of the card used.
3. Environmental detection and
monitoring of explosives
It has been known for many years that most
explosives are toxic [28]. Therefore, they not
only present a health hazard to munition work-
ers and military personnel who handle them, but
also constitute a general environmental prob-
lem. The disposal of obsolete explosives and
munitions was not always carried out in an
environmentally acceptable manner. Explosives
and ammunition used to be buried in the
ground and explosives-containing wastewater
from explosives and munition manufacture
used to be discharged into rivers and streams.
In order to assess the extent of explosive
contamination in suspected areas, it is necessary
to detect and identify the explosives and their
degradation products in groundwater and soil. It
is important to be able to detect the explosives
on-site in the contaminated area, using field tests
or mobile detectors. Fast screening is essential
for the determination of explosives in soil before
they decompose and leach into the groundwater.
Some of the analytical methods, such as GC,
high-performance liquid chromatography
(HPLC), GC/MS and IMS, have been adapted
for use in field analyses of explosives. However,
some explosive detectors have been specially
developed for environmental detection and/or
screening of explosives on site.
3.1. Immunochemical detection methods
Immunoassays are immunochemical detection
methods based on a reaction between a target
analyte and a specific antibody [29]. Quantita-
tion is achieved by monitoring a color change or
by measuring radioactivity or fluorescence.
296 trends in analytical chemistry, vol. 21, no. 4, 2002
3.1.1. Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays
In the enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA), the specificity of the antibody for the
analyte and the resultant immune complex is the
basis of these immunoassays.
An ELISA has been developed for TNT and
other nitrocompounds [30]. TNT could be
detected within the range 0.02–20 mg/L, with a
detection limit of about 20 ng/L. This method
was used in a portable device for rapid field
screening for TNT in water and soil [31]. A
quantitative color response was obtained to
concentrations of TNT in the range 1–30 mg/L
in water and 50–1000 mg/kg in soil.
3.1.2. Fiber-optic biosensor
The fiber-optic biosensor is based on a com-
petitive fluoroimmunoassay performed on the
surface of an optical fiber probe [32–34].
When antibodies, immobilized on the fiber
surface, bind the fluorescently labeled TNT
analog (or RDX analog), laser light in the eva-
nescent wave excites the fluorophore, generat-
ing a signal. TNT (or RDX), present in the
sample, prevents such binding, thereby decreas-
ing the signal. Detection limits of TNT and
RDX in groundwater were 5 mg/L [33]. Detec-
tion limits of TNT and RDX in soil acetone
extracts were 0.5 mg/kg (0.1 mg/L) [34].
3.1.3. Displacement flow immunosensor
The biosensor uses antibody recognition of
analyte molecules and subsequent fluorescence
detection downstream to measure TNT and
RDX levels in groundwater and soil [35–37].
The system comprises either fused-silica capil-
laries or activated porous membranes (onto
which either TNT or RDX antibodies are
immobilized and saturated with labeled antigen),
which are inserted into microreactor columns
that are incorporated in a flow system.
Target analyte is introduced upstream of the
microreactor, while the displacement of labeled
antigen is monitored downstream by a fluo-
rometer. The concentration of displaced labeled
antigen detected is proportional to the con-
centration of the target analyte introduced into
the system.
Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of a dual analyte
capillary-based displacement flow immuno-
sensor system [35]. This system comprises two
capillaries, one coated with antibodies specific
for TNT and the other specific for RDX.
The detection limit for the membrane-based
format [37] was 1 ng/ml, which corresponded
to a detection limit of about 80 ppt for TNT
and RDX. The sensor was reusable and suitable
for continuous monitoring of explosives, with an
operating lifetime of over 50 positive samples.
Fig. 3. Schematic diagram showing the dual-analyte, capillary-based, displacement-flow immunosensor system. Yo represents the
antibodies immobilized to the walls of the capillary and saturated with bound labeled antigen. Reproduced with permission from
[35]. (# Copyright 1998 by Academic Press).
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3.2. Electrochemical detection methods
3.2.1. Amperometric gas sensor
In amperometric gas sensors, measurements
are made by recording the current in the elec-
trochemical cell between working (or sensing)
and counter (or auxiliary) electrodes at a certain
potential. As gas sensors are not sensitive
enough to measure directly TNT vapor, a sys-
tem was developed in which characteristic cata-
lytic degradation products of TNT, undergoing
pyrolysis, were detected [38].
The method, for in-situ detection of TNT in
contaminated soils, was based on thermal
decomposition of TNT over platinum and
measurement of the nitric oxide (NO) vapor
generated by miniature amperometric sensors.
A penetrometer system probe was designed to
accommodate the electrochemical sensor for
measurement of explosive contamination [39].
An amperometric sensor with gold electrodes
was used to detect selectively nitrogen oxides; it
does not detect CO and CO2. The sensor
response was reproducible with a precision of
10%. The sensor response was proportional
to soil concentration of TNT over the range
of 1–500 ppm, with an analysis time of less than
4 min.
3.2.2. Voltammetry sensors
Potentiometric sensors based on cyclic vol-
tammetry [40] and square-wave voltammetry
[41] were developed for the detection of TNT
in water and soil. Cyclic voltammograms and
square-wave voltammograms, respectively, were
recorded to determine the potentials corre-
sponding to the peak currents, which were
found to be directly proportional to the TNT
concentration. Detection limits were about 200
mg/L and 30 mg/L for river and drinking water
samples, respectively, with a signal-to-noise ratio
of 3 [41].
4. Detection of landmines
There are at least 125 million unexploded
landmines buried in 70 countries around the
world. The concept of the landmine is very
simple: a sensor detects a target, which activates
a sensitive detonator, which in turn sets off a
larger quantity of a high explosive.
All the components are encased in metal,
plastic, ceramic or wood. The most used explo-
sive for the main charge is TNT. Other explo-
sives used are RDX, Composition B (RDX +
TNT), tetryl and C-4 (RDX-based). In addition,
mines have a booster charge to enhance the
power released by the detonator. Landmines
can be classified into two groups: (1) antitank
mines, designed to be triggered by heavy vehi-
cles, containing 2–10 kg of explosive and acti-
vated by pressures of hundreds of kg; and, (2)
antipersonnel mines, containing 10–250 g of
explosive, designed to detonate under pressures
of 0.5–50 kg.
The inherent difficulty of mine clearance is
complicated by the great variety of mines in use.
More than 700 types are known, they come in a
variety of sizes and shapes, they are made of
many different materials, and they are found in
various locations and soil matrix conditions.
Most modern landmines contain only a small
amount of metal, so that traditional detection
techniques based on metal detectors are less
useful than before. Table 2 gives a list of some
common antipersonnel landmines, including the
type of explosive(s) used in each [2].
Detection methods can be subdivided into
anomaly detectors and detectors based on che-
mical sensing of explosives.
4.1. Anomaly detectors [2]
Anomaly detectors detect objects that are not
expected in their natural environments. They
include: manual mine clearance by prodding the
ground; metal detectors; magnetometers;
mechanical detection techniques; ground pene-
trating radar (GPR); infrared imaging; and,
backscattered X-rays.
4.2. Chemical sensors
Distinct from anomaly detectors, which look
for the container holding the explosive, chemical
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sensors look for the explosive contained inside
the landmine, either by sniffing the explosive
vapor or by bulk detection.
4.2.1. Vapor detection
When a landmine is buried in the ground,
vapors emanating from the explosive begin to
leak from the landmine into the soil. A fraction
of these explosive vapors reach the surface of
the ground and can be detected [42]. Two types
of methods have been suggested:
a. Explosive vapor detectors similar to those
used to detect hidden explosives in airport
luggage and mail (see paragraph 2.1.
above)
b. Artificial sensors. Efforts are being made
to produce an ‘‘electronic nose’’, using
advanced material technology [43–46].
A sensor, using novel fluorescent polymers,
has been developed to detect TNT and other
landmine-signature vapors in air [47]. Thin film
of these polymers undergoes a large reduction
in emission intensity when molecules of TNT
bind to the polymer, resulting in an amplifica-
tion of the fluorescence-quenching response.
The polymer structure contains receptor sites
designed to interact specifically with nitroaro-
matic explosives, thus enhancing the selectivity
of the polymers for the analytes emanating from
the landmines. Detection limit of TNT in
headspace samples was found to be 1 fg at a
signal-to-noise ratio of 3.
4.2.2. Bulk detection
a. Neutron analysis (see paragraph 2.2.2)
[48].
b. Nuclear quadrupole resonance (NQR) (see
paragraph 2.2.3) [49].
5. Summary
Mobile and hand-held explosives detectors
have been developed for field detection of
explosives in various applications, such as air-
port luggage, environmental monitoring and
detection of landmines.
The principles of operation of the main
detectors in use are based on: ionization and
separation analysis of the explosive vapor; pyr-
olysis and gas-phase reactions; bulk detection by
means of a reaction of an incident radiation with
an element or elements of the explosive com-
pound; and, detection of a product of a
biochemical reaction with the explosive.
Table 2
List of common anti-personnel landmines [2]
Type Manufacturing country Weight
[kg]
Mine-case
material
Mine-case
color
Mine fuse Explosive
charge
Explosive
weight [g]
Type 69 China 1.35 Cast iron Olive drab Pressure or tripwire TNT 105
Type 72 China, S. Africa 0.125 Plastic Green Pressure TNT/RDX
(50/50)
75 or 100
M14 USA, India 0.158 Plastic Olive drab Pressure Tetryl 29
M16A1 USA 3.57 Steel Green Trip wire, pressure TNT 513
M18A1 USA, Chile, South Korea 1.58 Plastic Olive drab Command detonation C-4 682
Valmara 69 Italy 3.3 Plastic Green, sand Trip wire, pressure Comp. B 597
VS-50 Egypt, Italy, Singapore 0.185 Plastic Olive drab,
sand
Pressure RDX 43
PP-MI-SR Czech Republic 3.2 Steel,
plastic
Olive drab Trip wire, pressure TNT 362
MON-200 Russia 25 Metal Olive drab Trip wire,
command detonation
TNT 12 kg
PMN Russia, Iraq 0.55 Bakelite Black Delay-armed, pressure TNT/Tetryl 200
POMZ-2 Russia, North Korea,
Germany, China
2.3 Metal Olive drab Trip wire TNT 75
PMD-6 Russia 0.4 Wood Natural wood Pressure TNT 200
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